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Greece - Page 3

post #31 of 41
$60 will buy a lot of Ouzo and Retsina.
post #32 of 41
Good stuff. Us in 25 years.
post #33 of 41
If Greece pulls out of the Euro, it could be the bargain vacation destination of the decade
post #34 of 41
Let's just get Greece sorted
All this dithering over Greece is getting boring. European ministers flexing their muscles and posturing over whether they can help the Greek people of not. Why don't we the people just sort it instead?

The European Union is home to 503 million people, if we all just chip in a few Euro then we can get Greece sorted and hopefully get them back on track soon. Easy.

What We Need & What You Get
€1.6bn is what the Greeks need. It might seem like a lot but it's only just over €3 from each European. That's about the same as half a pint in London. Or everyone in the EU just having a Feta and Olive salad for lunch.

So come on, order a Feta and Olive salad, maybe wash it down with an Ouzo or glass of Assyrtiko greek wine and let's sort this shit out.

Pledge €3 and get a postcard sent from Greece of Alex Tsipras, the Greek Prime Minister. We'll get them made and posted in Greece and give a boost to some local printers and post offices. Maybe the odd will write Efharisto on it for you.

Pledge €6 and get a greek Feta and Olive salad

Pledge €10 and get a small bottle of Ouzo sent to you

Pledge €25 and get a bottle of Greek wine

Is that really all it would take?
OK, it might be a short while for the cash to get fully into the Greek economy, but hell - what is there to lose? Another Tesco Meal deal? Ah well.
You get some tasty Greek things.

We promise that all profits will go to the Greek people and all products will be 100% Greek.

Oh my god, I just pulled a gut muscle laughing so hard. This is genius level stuff.
post #35 of 41
Anyone heard about paper IMF of SEA countries into EMU ?
Edited by satrorianogreco - 6/1/16 at 2:11pm
post #36 of 41
Originally Posted by Hannerhan View Post


Now that's rich.

Here's the rub. Take a look at Greece's productivity stats (I'll use OECD data as well to keep it consistent): http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=LEVEL

So you tell me who is really working harder?


 Thats the cause of the crisis? Here is something for you :






Do explain, and  how the  Netherlands who has a average of work 29 hours a week has a better economy?

Do explain  how the SEA countries  had surplus before EMU, and  how  flooding with consumer credit  didn't have impact and how SEA countries  in EMU/EU   had deficits and how thats did not lead to crisis . Here is some a research paper of IMF  for you  it shows of SEA road countries into EMU  prior and when they got in and  how  NEA countries profited and, how the crisis happens : 





Stylized facts Current accounts in the SEA have been deteriorating sharply since the mid-1990s, growing from a surplus of 0.1 percent on average in 1994 to a deficit of 10 percent in 2008 (Figures 1 and 2).5 This downward trend is shared by most countries in the region, although it started later for Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia than for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain coinciding with their later entry into the EMU and euro area. This overall pattern of growing external deficits is in sharp contrast to NEA which accumulated current account surpluses of the order of 2‒3 percent of GDP after 1994





While the paper simplifies for the sake of the analysis, it should be noted that the north-south divide is not clear-cut and there is also variation within groups. On the one hand, current account deficits remained at more moderate levels in Malta, Slovenia, and especially Italy (3 percent of GDP). On the other hand, some NEA countries (e.g. Ireland) were also running large current account deficits prior to the crisis. Countries within a group also have different structural settings (e.g. financial sector size and development, labor market institutions) and starting positions (e.g. savings, competitiveness and per capita income). The decline in current accounts in SEA was accompanied by a fall in private saving and to a lesser extent a rise in investment (Figures 3 and 4). On average across the region, private saving rates declined by 10 percentage points between 1994 and 2008, while investment rates increased by 2 percentage points and public saving rates improved by about 2 percentage points. Of course, the distribution between saving and investment varies across countries.

In Greece, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Malta, declines in private saving rates were the predominant factor behind the decline in the current account. Spain is a well-known example where investment boomed, especially in the construction sector, but falling private saving rates contributed equally to the deterioration of its external position. In Slovenia investment boomed too, while private saving actually improved. Cyprus and Malta experienced an investment boom after EU accession in 2004. However, investment still remained below the high levels of the mid-1990s. In countries where it increased, investment went mostly to the construction sector, while investment in machinery and equipment only increased moderately or declined, suggesting that much of the rise in investment permitted by higher external debt was channeled into the less productive nontradeable sectors (Figure 5). While saving and investment rates started broadly similar to those of NEA in 1994, they have been diverging substantially in subsequent years. By 2008, saving rates in most SEA countries were substantially below the average for NEA, due to both lower private and public saving, while investment rates were broadly in line with the average level in NEA except in Spain and Slovenia, where they were much higher. It is interesting to note that while public saving improved over the period in SEA, it did less so than in NEA. Hence, the relative buoyancy of the private sector in SEA was compounded by a less restrictive stance of the public sector than in NEA. The current account deficits were heavily financed with debt instead of FDI (Figure 6). The larger countries, Spain, Greece and to a lesser extent Italy, were large importers of bond-related inflows, while Portugal and Slovenia took in large foreign loans. 7 Cyprus and Malta are a bit of an exception, in that they received substantial net FDI inflows of the order of 5 and 10 percent of GDP respectively on average over the period 2000‒20088 . Cyprus also relied on non-resident deposits to finance its current account deficit, while Malta used very large inflows of non-resident deposits to invest in non-resident assets with a neutral effect on its financial account. The decline in saving and increase in investment had their counterparts in a fall of the trade balance (as imports increased), a large decrease in net income, and a decline in net transfers (Figure 7, Table 1). Of the 10 percentage point average decline in the current account, the trade balance contributed 2.8 percentage points, net income contributed 3.6 percentage points, and net transfers 3.6 percentage points. Excluding oil, the trade balance improves slightly, but the deterioration of the current account remains sizeable at some 6½ percentage points on average.



The decline in SEA current accounts coincided with the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its subsequent introduction of the euro. After a first stage of financial liberalization that occurred broadly between 1990 and 1993, the four largest SEA countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) joined EMU in 1994 and the euro area in 1999 (2001 for Greece). The three smaller SEA countries (Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia) started the process later, by joining the EMU around 2004 and the euro area in 2007-2008 (Table 2). These dates correspond broadly to the start of the deterioration of current accounts (EMU) and its subsequent acceleration (euro area) (Figure 9). Hence, it is natural to ask whether participation into EMU caused this decline and if so, through which mechanisms.11 In what follows, the four early joiners are referred to as SEA-4 and the three later joiners as SEA-3. 


SEA countries made great strides in financial liberalization, converging towards levels in NEA countries (Figure 10).12 Liberalization was broad-based, involving relaxation of capital controls, entry barriers, quantitative credit controls, and improved financial supervision, although privatization efforts were slower. While substantial financial liberalization took place in the earlier stage of EMU, it has also been driven by exogenous non-EU related developments and by the EU internal market project. However, the “gates” were open to let capital and credit flow in once the European integration process intensified. Financial liberalization removed barriers to capital inflows, which triggered inflows into lower-income countries with bigger investment needs. The liberalization of domestic financial systems also reduced the need for domestic saving, as credit became more readily available. A narrower indicator focusing on capital account openness shows a similar picture for SEA-3 as for SEA-4, with financial liberalization largely taking place in the early stage of EMU.13 The creation of EMU was marked by a substantial improvement in macroeconomic policies in an effort to reach the “convergence criteria”14 to enter the euro area (Figure 11). In the early 1990s, SEA countries continued to run large fiscal deficits. During stage 2 of EMU, fiscal deficits of SEA were brought down at or below the 3 percent of GDP benchmark, except in Greece where they consistently stayed higher. Moreover, inflation in SEA declined from double-digit figures on average in the early 1990s to a low of 2 percent in 2007. The inflation differentials between SEA and NEA narrowed from 5.5 percent in 1994 to less than 1 percent in 2008. The potential effects on current accounts are twofold: on one hand, lower fiscal deficits and inflation help improve the current account; on the other, the sounder macroeconomic policies contributed to reducing interest costs on foreign borrowing, due to a lower country risk premium. 

Edited by satrorianogreco - 6/1/16 at 4:39pm
post #37 of 41

Here is something else in regard to IMF and ECB  bail outs how they end up  :




post #38 of 41
Wow, bringing back Greece.

Get a clue, no one cares.
post #39 of 41
Originally Posted by Harold falcon View Post

Wow, bringing back Greece.

Get a clue, no one cares.

Well thats kool story and all old chap, boss man.
But however the thing is, this is an public forum. Im posting in regard to OT and rest of replies in regard.
Feel free not to participate, go else where though ol chap if you feel bored.
Edited by satrorianogreco - 6/2/16 at 5:56am
post #40 of 41
Your country is shit. You had your chance 2500 years ago, then you killed Socrates. You don't get a choice anymore. You failed. Go back to bankruptcy. Maybe China will bail you out.
post #41 of 41
Originally Posted by Harold falcon View Post

Your country is shit. You had your chance 2500 years ago, then you killed Socrates. You don't get a choice anymore. You failed. Go back to bankruptcy. Maybe China will bail you out.

Keep on smoking what you smoking on the way go learn some history,
otherwise if you have to say anything in related to economy with facts more than welcome to reply.
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